Butler: Gender Trouble Part 3

1. The Body Politics of Julia Kristeva

Butler focuses this section on deconstructing Julia Kristeva’s theory of the “semiotic dimension of language” which is based off of Lacan’s “Symbolic” theory. The two main terms that Butler uses in this section is “symbolic” and “semiotic”.

“Symbolic” (according to Lacan) is “the paternal law structures all linguistic signification” which has become a “universal organizing principle of culture itself”. Butler further explains: “this (paternal) law creates the possibility of meaningful language and, hence, meaningful experience, through the repression of primary libidinal drives, including the radical dependency of the child on the maternal body” (107).

Kristeva’s purpose is not to refute Lacan’s primary premise but “serves as a perpetual source of subversion within the Symbolic” (108). She suggests using poetic language for her “semiotic” argument. “Poetic language is the recovery of the maternal body within the terms of language, one that has the potential to disrupt, subvert, and displace the paternal law”. Maybe I completely missed this, but what exactly does she mean by ‘poetic language’? I still don’t have a good grasp of this.

I think Butler makes a really good point when she states “Her (Kristeva) theory appears to depend upon the stability and reproduction of precisely the paternal law that she seeks to displace”. Also because Kristeva doesn’t admit that the semiotic is always subordinate to the Symbolic. But Kristeva’s strategic task is “neither to replace the Symbolic possibility, but rather to validate those experiences within the Symbolic that permit a manifestation of the borders which divide the Symbolic from the semiotic” (115).

Butler continues to discuss Kristeva’s second point which is the maternal body. She states that for Kristeva, “poetry and maternity represent privileged practices within paternally sanctioned culture which permit a nonpyschotic experience of that heterogeneity and dependency characteristic of the maternal terrain” (116). But Butler criticizes Kristeva for not challenging the structuralist assumption that the paternal law is foundation to culture itself and that change must com from within (117).

Butler than goes on to talk about Kristeva’s point on homosexuality and how “both maternity and poetry constitute melancholic experiences for women appropriately acculturated into heterosexuality” (117). I’m not quite sure where Butler and Kristeva were going with the argument of lesbianism

2. Foucault, Herculine, and the Politics of Sexual Discontinuity

In this section Butler discusses Foucault’s theory of sexuality offered in his book “The History of Sexuality, Volume 1” and how his theory contradicts with what he wrote about Herculine Barbin, a nineteenth-century French hermaphrodite who was born a girl but showed male sex characteristics and physical features. Butler states “Foucault understands sexuality as saturated with power and offers a critical view of theories that lay claim to a sexuality before or after the law” (127).

"The 'Fair Deal'? Unpacking Accounts of Reciprocity in Heterosex"

This is an article about a study conducted by Virginia Braun, Nicola Gavey, and Kathryn McPhillips on the discourse of reciprocity in heterosexual sex relationships. This study was done in New Zealand with 15 women and 15 men and with an age range from 18-50 years. They were recruited to share their experiences and thoughts about heterosexual sex. The next paragraph states their purpose for this research:

"Reciprocity is a basic premise of egalitarian relationships, and is typically depicted as a 'good thing' within heterosexual sex and relationships...[but] we argue that notions of reciprocity are not necessarily as liberatory as they might seem, as they do not occur in a social or sexual vacuum. In conjunction with other dominant sexual meanings, a discourse of reciprocity produces entitlements and obligations that can render 'choice' in heterosex problematic, particularly for women" (237).

Braun et al. starts out by stating that sex is something that has been socially constructed (237). An example of this is how Wendy Hollway’s discourses of heterosexual sex relationships remain influential in constructing ideas about, and practices of, heterosex in the West. The first being a male sexual drive discourse, meaning men need orgasm. The second being a have/hold discourse where it is more of a traditional romance ideal. And the third being a permissive discourse meaning anything goes as long as no one gets hurt (238). Braun et al. also acknowledge that heterosexual practice is not only influenced by discourses of (hetero) sexuality but also by other cultural values and discourses.

Typically, as argued by Gilfoyle et al., there is an unequal ‘givings’ based on gender. For example, women tend to give more than men. Women are seen as objects that are both ‘given away’ and ‘given to’ as opposed to men who are positioned as agents by giving and taking pleasure (240).

As for discourses, there have been many starting from the 1920s and 1930s where it was allowed to promote sexual reciprocity. This desire for reciprocity in sexual relationship is also evident in (radical) feminist critiques of heterosex (239). In this discourse, heterosexual relationships are identified as the oppression of women in which “‘heterosexual desire is eroticized power difference’” (240). By looking at these cultural values and discourses, we can begin to understand how reciprocity plays out in heterosexual sex relationships.

The most interesting part about this article is when Braun et al. discuss about “patterns of sex to orgasm” and their findings. They state that “heterosexual activity have typically reported sex to be highly patterned” (242). It’s the sequence of events such as: kissing, tongue kissing, manual and oral caressing of the body, particularly the female breasts, manual and oral contacts with both the female and male genitalia, followed by intercourse in a number of positions. It’s usually the female who orgasm first followed by the male orgasm. Her orgasms are generally represented by what he did or gave her as opposed to his orgasm as something “we” did or where his orgasm took place. This means that “the man is represented as more active in the production of orgasm—both hers and his own—than is the woman” (243). Braun et al. concludes that this is a subtle account of the traditional expectations of women in heterosex.

It was also interesting to read how some of the men and women felt from their interviews. One man in particular expressed that if he got an orgasm and his partner didn’t, than he felt he was “using” her (245). But if his partner receives some orgasms then he deserved one too. I really like it when Braun et al. acknowledge that “female orgasm can be important for men not simply for reciprocity and the importance of the woman’s pleasure, but also as an indicator of performance and his skills as a lover” (248).

As Braun et al. continues on to talk about how although a woman’s entitle to have an orgasm, her orgasm can be seen as an obligation to establish sexual normality to reinforce her partner’s “sexpertise” (252). I think this article brings to light a lot of the important issues that couples struggle with when striving for an egalitarian relationship. Sometimes, it doesn’t occur to us how reciprocity really works until a study like this is done.

“What is different about our manifestation of reciprocity is that it reduces it to a purely sexual, even orgasmic, level” (254).